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1. Introduction 
Based on different underlying assets and instruments, derivatives are traded in the absence of 
clearing houses and organised markets. Since they are not exchange-traded, derivatives are not 
widely understood. In Over-the-counter (OTC) markets, counterparty default risk generates a 
network of interdependencies among market actors, promotes risk volatility and results in 
systemic risk. The largest bankruptcy in the US, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., was the result 
of derivatives financing.1 The same OTC financing caused the failure of the Barings Bank in 
1990s.2 Presently, an estimated amount of US$604.6 trillion is outstanding from OTC 
derivatives contracts,3 which is roughly more than ten times of the world GDP (US$57.53 
trillion). The inherent lack of transparency in OTC markets impairs price discovery and 
obviates the efficient markets hypothesis, i.e., the OTC derivatives and the risks associated with 
them may be priced incorrectly. 
The aim of this article is to examine the threat of systemic risk posed by speculative OTC 
derivative financing to financial institutions and the efforts made by the regulators to reduce 
such risk. A critical and comparative analysis of the Anglo-American approach to regulate OTC 
derivatives is endeavoured, in order to evaluate how these advanced economies have proven 
effective in achieving the ultimate objectives of financial stability, certainty and predictability. 
The Article examines how the financial regulators of these advanced economies have responded 
to the vociferous public debate about the threats that OTC derivative financing may have on 
the overall stability of contemporary financial systems. While the threat is the same, there are 
substantial differences in regulatory approaches and conclusions. The article concludes by 
showing how OTC derivatives regulations of advanced economies can be applied to emerging 
financial markets in order to both increase market efficiency and attain financial stability. 
In addition to the introduction and conclusion this article is divided into four main parts 
where each part has its own introduction and conclusions. Chapter 2 begins with an 
introduction to financial derivatives; the derivatives products (contracts) viz. forwards, swaps 
and options are introduced and their possible uses, i.e., arbitrage, hedging and speculation are 
explored. Chapter 3 investigates different types of risks associated with derivatives financing 
and the legal nature of derivatives contracts and concludes with an analysis of the different 
regulatory approaches adopted for OTC derivatives.  
 
1See online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122166095912947875.html?KEYWORDS=Lehman+ 
Brothers+Holdings+Inc 
2A. S. Bhalla; Collapse of Barings Bank: Case of Market Failure; (Economic and Political Weekly); Vol. 30, No. 13 
(Apr. 1, 1995), pp. 658-662 
3 See online at http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf 
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Chapter 4 gives a detailed analysis of and compares the OTC regulation in the United 
Kingdom (the UK) and the United States of America (the US). The purpose is to identify any 
similarities and differences in these two regulatory approaches that deal with the identical 
problem of systemic risk posed by OTC derivatives. Chapter 5 begins with the assessment of 
potential benefits of OTC derivates. After outlining the potential benefits and also the 
potential risks of the OTC derivatives for the developing economies, the article gives concrete 
solutions for the developing economies to regulate their OTC financial markets. 
2. An Introduction to Financial Derivatives Contracts 
2.1  Derivatives Contracts in General 
This chapter describes the nature of a derivative transaction. After exploring the difference 
between exchange traded and “over the counter” (OTC) derivatives, some important derivatives 
products like forwards, options and swaps, are evaluated. It also looks at the rationale of 
derivative financing and the driving force that has lead the financial markets to invent 
derivatives. In this context, concepts like hedging, speculation and arbitrage, are discussed. It 
concludes that derivatives financing, whether driven by hedging or speculation, is inherently 
open to certain kinds of risks. 
A derivative is a transaction originating from an underlying instrument and it derives its value 
from that underlying instrument. Derivatives underlyings include corporate bonds, payment 
obligations under a loan agreement, shares, commodities, indexes, interest rate, but this list is 
by no means exhaustive. A derivative contract is purely financial in its nature. In both financial 
contracts and contracts for real goods and services, the contract requires that the underlying 
security or good be delivered either immediately or later on an agreed date.4 This, however, is 
not the case with a derivative contract. In a financial derivatives contract, the parties at the 
outset of the contract intend no actual delivery of the underlying instrument or asset. This is 
the factor that converts an ordinary futures contract into a derivative contract.5 In a derivative 
futures contract the delivery is intended to be settled by payment of a single lump sum, or some 
other special arrangement.6 The underlyings from which derivatives derive their value are called 
derivative products.  
Derivative contracts can be transacted in one of two ways. First, it can be transacted on an 
exchange. This is generally referred to as an exchange-traded derivative contract and is subject 
to the rules governing transactions on the exchange. The clearinghouse of the exchange 
 
4 Don M. Chance; An Introduction to Options and Futures; (The Pryden Press Chicago 1989), p.3 
5 Cf. Simon James; The Law of Derivatives; (LLP1999), p.3 
6 As we will discuss later the buyer and seller ‘closeout’ the contract by taking off-setting positions 
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interposes itself between the buyer and the seller, and acts as a central counterparty of all 
derivative deals. To protect itself from insolvency, the clearinghouse requires traders to deposit 
an initial margin. Additional margin calls are also made on the basis of movements in derivative 
prices. Most of the terms of an exchange-traded derivative are standardized.7  
Alternatively, derivatives contracts can be entered as ‘over the counter’ (OTC). An OTC 
derivative contract is separately negotiated and a tailor-made contract as compared to a standard 
and readymade exchange-traded derivatives contract and parties can enter into the terms of 
their own choice, including the maturity date and contract volume. Parties, if they desire, can 
make an OTC derivatives contract subject to exchange rules. The eminent backdrop for OTC 
derivatives is the absence of formally organised market (e.g. an exchange for exchange-traded 
derivatives) and channelled counterparty risk assessment.8 Since OTC derivatives remain the 
main focus of discussion in this article, identifying the specialised OTC derivatives products is 
next on the agenda. 
2.2 Derivatives products 
2.2.1. Forwards Contracts 
As said earlier, a derivative derives its value from an underlying instrument or asset where there 
is no exhaustive list of such underlyings. The spectrum of these underlyings can, however, be 
condensed by dividing them according to the nature and form of the transaction involved. 
These transactions are, in other words, the building blocks of a derivatives contract. The most 
popular type of derivatives contracts is a forwards contract. Forwards contracts can be either 
‘financial forwards’ or ‘commodity forwards’, depending on the underlying asset. Principally, a 
forwards contract is an agreement to deliver in the future at the price agreed upon now. A 
financial forwards contract, as compared to commodity forwards contracts, calls for the delivery 
of a security not a commodity at a future date. 
A forwards contract is converted into a derivatives contract when it is agreed that the physical 
delivery of the underlying will not actually take place and that the contract will be concluded by 
the payment of the sum of money i.e., the difference between the contract price and the market 
price at the relevant time.9 At that time, the contract is said to be closed out,10 and the total gain 
 
7 Cf. Charles Good hart; The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulations; (Central Banking Publications 1998), 
p.293 
8 Cf. C. Good hart; Op. cit. p.293 
9 S. James; The Law of Derivatives;(LLP1999), p.4 
10 The term signifies the settlement of contract as cash settlement rather than physical settlement and sometimes 
the contract is closed out by the buyer selling another contract to the seller of the base contract or entering into 
another equal but opposite contract, with a third party. Cf. Simon James; Op. cit. p.4  
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or loss of the counterparty is the change in the futures price between the time the original 
contract was entered into and the time it was closed out.  
Forwards contracts, when traded on an exchange are called futures contracts, and are subject to 
exchange rules and regulations and will also be interposed by a clearinghouse. This removes the 
counterparty risk from the futures contract. In the absence of a clearinghouse as mandatory 
counterparty with margin requirements imposed to cushion losses, forwards are highly risky 
transactions. The process of forwards pricing entails consideration of different costs like 
storage, commissions and spreads. The prices are calculated on a ‘Cash & Carry’ basis and are 
not merely predictions.11 
The forwards market operates through informal communications among major financial 
institutions. For example, there is a healthy forwards market for foreign currencies that gives 
individuals or companies the opportunity to buy or sell foreign currency at a later date at an 
exchange-rate agreed upon today. The absence of an organised market in forwards also makes 
them less standardised and, consequently, its extent and volume is not precisely known. 
2.2.2. Swaps Contracts 
In a swaps contract, two counterparties agree to exchange streams of payments over time on 
predetermined terms. In fact, the parties exchange less favourable obligations for more 
favourable obligations. There are two main types of swaps, interest rate swaps and currency 
swaps. The principle behind a swaps contract is that of comparative advantage. For example, in 
interest rate swaps, a party - due to its higher credit rating than another party - can get loans at 
lower interest rates as compared to the other party. The parties can enter into a swaps contract 
and the party with lower credit ratings (Low franchise/ high risk profile) and the party with 
higher credit ratings (high franchise/ low risk profile) can both benefit.  
Swaps are also used for risk management against adverse market movements. Interest rate swaps 
are the most common example of risk management-oriented swaps contracts. With interest rate 
swaps, two parties exchange interest payment obligations on debts denominated in the same 
currency, whereas in a currency swap parties exchange interest payment obligations on debts 
denominated in different currencies. Another difference between interest rate and currency 
swaps is that in an interest rate swap there is no exchange of payment obligations of the 
principal amount, while in currency swaps, the principal amounts are also exchanged at 
 
11 S. James; Op. cit. p.6 
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maturity at an exchange-rate agreed in advance.12 Interest rate swaps are generally used in a 
combination of floating and fixed rate.13 
Equity swaps are another kind of swaps agreement in which a party exchanges the performance 
of a share owned by it in an exchange for the performance of another share owned by another 
party in a different exchange. Parties then pay the difference of appreciation or depreciation in 
the exchanged shares. In this way parties can enjoy the benefit of the shares in a particular 
company without buying them and thus avoid buying costs. However, swaps agreements expose 
a party to credit and currency risks. For this reason financial institutions usually work as 
intermediaries and efforts continue to be made to standardise swaps contracts.14 
2.2.3. Options Contracts 
An option is the right, without the obligation, to buy or sell a thing at a later date at a price 
agreed upon today. In return for the extra flexibility an option gives, and unlike forwards and 
swaps contract, the buyer of an option pays the seller a premium in return for the risk associated 
with it. An option to buy something is referred to as a ‘call’ and an option to sell something is 
called a ‘put’. In broad terms, many financial arrangements like lines of credit, loan guarantees 
and insurances are forms of options. Moreover, stocks themselves constitute an option on a firm’s 
assets.15 Options are symbolically known as European, American, Asian or Bermudan depending 
upon the nature and time of the exercise of the right created by an options contract.16 
To control interest rate exposures, borrowers can buy a put option for a fee paid to a lender or an 
investment bank (writer). If the interest rate rises above a particular rate the borrower only pays 
up to that particular rate and the writer pays the excess. This is called a ‘cap’. The borrower may 
agree that if the rate falls below a particular rate, it will still pay that particular rate. This is known 
as the ‘floor’. When options are used in a cap and floor combination the arrangement is termed 
‘collar’. Obviously, collar costs much less than cap. Beside the counterparty risk, the market risk 
and legal risks are transparent in options contracts. Another element of risk in the options 
contracts is that there is no solid economic equation or mathematical formula to calculate the 
exact price for an option.17 Most of the options trading occur in organised exchanges.  
 
12 Denis Petkovic; Derivatives- some fundamental Contracts and Concepts; (International Banking and Financial 
Law 1996), p.102 
13 S. James; Op. cit. p.6-7 
14 On international level, International Swaps and Derivatives Associations (ISDA)  
15 Don M. Chance, Op. cit. p.3 
16 For detailed view, see Denis Petkovic, Op. cit, p.103 
17 Black-Scholes equation is most popular to calculate the price of a European option but still it does not guarantee 
the ‘right’ price.  
 Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2010#1 
6
2.3 Why have derivatives? 
2.3.1. Market Volatility 
Movements in interest rates, exchange rates, commodities and securities prices are generally 
called market volatility. Derivatives financing is not only originated from market volatility but it 
can also create market volatility.18 Large swings in market volatility in one way or the other is 
always alarming for regulators since it can cause systemic risks. Systemic risk is the risk where 
the failure of one or more counterparties causes the failure of other counterparties and 
ultimately threatens to cause failure to the overall financial system. 
The general function of derivatives is to allow individual parties to transform risk arising out of 
market volatility. When used for risk management, derivatives can effectively reduce the risk 
associated with the individual user. This, however, as we will see later in this chapter, does not 
mean that they cannot cause systematic risk.  
The aim of derivatives transactions in the early 1990’s was to avoid exchange-control 
regulations.19 However, the derivatives market today is motivated by a variety of reasons. 
Derivatives, it has been suggested, are analogous to electricity in many ways since electricity also 
is simply a powerful tool that can be used for good or bad.20 Derivatives can amplify risk not 
only for the individual user but also for the overall financial system when traded for sole 
speculation. However, derivatives can be traded for arbitrage, hedging and speculation. 
2.3.2. The Difference between Arbitrage, Hedging and Speculation 
The principle working behind derivatives financing is that of comparative advantage. 
Arbitragers use a derivative product to benefit from the potential comparative advantage 
between competing financial markets. Arbitrage can take place in a variety of situations to 
achieve a variety of objectives. A company may have a comparative advantage in borrowing from 
another capital market than its native market. A company can borrow from that other market 
and enter into a currency swap contract to arbitrage between its comparative costs of funding. 
An arbitrager in this way can simply be a speculator, making profit from market differences, or 
it can be a hedger lowering its cost of funding due to market abnormalities.21 
 
18 R. Kelly & A. Hudson; Hedging our Future: Regulating the Derivative Market (Fabian Society 1994) Discussion 
Paper No. 18; p. 2  
19 Alastair Hudson, Op. cit, p.8 
20 Eric Bettelheim, Helen Parry & William Rees, Swaps and Off-exchange Derivatives Trading: Law and Regulation 
(FT Law and Tax 1996), p.XXXVI   
21 Ibid 
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Different financial markets have different tax and regulatory requirements and therefore call 
for different costs on the same transactions. An arbitrager makes profit out of these differences. 
Sometimes a market does not respond quickly to changes in other related markets and an 
arbitrager makes profit out of the time period a market allows before it responds to changes in 
other markets. Strategic use of derivatives can position market participants to acquire assets or 
cash settlements when such market mismatches arise, rather than waiting for the actual physical 
market to move.22 Adverse movements in financial markets remain a major concern for market 
participants. When hedging, derivatives work as a shield against the risk of adverse market 
conditions. A US court described hedging, as “safeguarding one’s self from loss on a bet or 
speculation by making compensatory arrangements on the other side.”23 In hedging, the hedger 
transfers a particular defined risk to the derivatives provider. For instance, for lenders lending 
on a fixed interest rate, future movements in the interest rate is always a major concern. An 
adverse movement in the interest rate can result in loss. With the help of a derivatives product 
(e.g. an interest rate swap agreement) the lender can hedge against the rising interest rate. 
Derivatives hedging strategies has made it possible for banks to offer fixed-rate house-financing 
spread upon long periods.24  
Derivatives allow the user to buy or sell in the future on a price agreed upon today. Obviously, 
if market volatility goes in favour of the user, he has made a profit. The adverse market volatility 
will result in loss. The magic of derivatives is that they allow this process without obliging the 
user to actually purchase the underlying asset or instrument. Participants can simply settle the 
contract by paying the difference between the agreed price and the actual market price.25 
Speculation in OTC derivatives is attractive since there are no initial margin requirements. 
Equity swaps, as discussed earlier,26 are a lowest cost method to explore share markets without 
incurring regulatory or other costs. Derivatives speculation is, therefore, a cheap and fast 
manner to magnify the market exposure of the speculator. 
  
It has been argued that derivatives should only be allowed for hedging and not for 
speculation.27 Since we are dealing with systemic risk caused by derivatives financing, it is 
important to analyse the difference between hedging and speculation. Both the hedger and the 
speculator try to benefit from future changes in a market position. The difference lies in their 
 
22 A. Hudson; op. cit. p. 12 
23 Whorley V. Patton-Kjose Co. 90 Mont.461, 5 p.2d 210,214 
24 Cf. Eric-Bettelheim Op. cit. p.XXXVIII  
25 Cf. Eric C-Bettelheim; Op. cit. p.XXXVII 
26 See Swaps Contracts at para 1.1.2.2 above. Also Hull, J.C An Introduction to Futures and Options Markets 3rd 
ed. (Prentice Hall 1998), p.8-9, Alastair Hudson, Op. cit. p.10 
27 R. Kelly & A. Hudson; Op. cit; p. 12  
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intended objectives. Hedging is a tool for risk management, whereas speculation occurs for the 
sole purpose of profit-making. For instance, a manufacturing company is hedging risk when it 
uses a forwards agreement to limit the impact that exchange rate fluctuations might have on an 
international trade deal. The same company would be speculating if it were to invest heavily in 
a foreign currency forward agreement solely in the assumption that a certain currency will move 
sharply in one direction or the other.  
In Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham LBC28 Lord Templeman tried to distinguish between 
hedging and speculation by saying that the key in determining whether a derivatives trade is a 
hedge or a speculation from the viewpoint of a particular counterparty is the intention of the 
trader concerned. However, it is uncertain whether the test to determine such intention is 
subjective that is, dependent upon the declared animus of the participant, or objective that is, 
derived from all the surrounding indicators of the intention.29 It has been suggested that since 
the reason to enter into a trade is insolubly linked to the individual judgement of the trader, 
the subjective test is more practicable.30 Two issues arise at this point: firstly, the declared 
animus of the participants can be misleading because accountancy, tax, capital adequacy and 
other motives lead the participants to designate them as hedging; and secondly, it is not 
possible for an outsider to effectively assess the actual objective that a participant intends to 
achieve.31 The subjective test is, therefore, not practicable for either the market participant, 
whose focus is to assess the potential counterparty; or the regulator, whose focus is to gauge the 
overall structure of the market.  
2.4. Should Hedging Be Compulsory?32 
Hedging strategies are recognised as efficient tools for risk management. Some US courts have 
held that fiduciaries, like corporate directors and trustees, are under a duty to mitigate risk 
arsing from exposures to interest and foreign-exchange rates and commodity prices. The Court 
of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in Hoye v. Meek33, found that the director of a company had 
breached its fiduciary duty (His duty of care and loyalty to look out for the best interest of the 
company) by failing to respond to the increasing exposures of his company, in its Ginnie Mae 
investments, as the interest rate rose. By maintaining that “ignorance is not a basis for escaping 
liability”, the Court imposed on the director, not only a duty to enquire into the risk exposure 
 
28 [1992] 2A.C.1, 24B, 31F 
29 Alastair Hudson, Op. cit. p.157  
30 Steven Edwards; Legal Principles of Derivatives ;(J.B.L. 2002) 
31 Cf. C. Good hart; Op. cit; p. 298 
32 Cf. A. Hudson, Op. cit. p.57 
33 795 F.2d 893 (10 Cir. 1986) 
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of the company, but also a duty to do something about it. In Brane v. Roth34 shareholders of a 
grain cooperative claimed that the directors breeched their fiduciary duties by failing to protect 
the cooperatives profits through hedging in the grain futures market. The Court agreed and 
awarded the shareholders over US$ 400,000 in damages. A Washington State Court of Appeals 
in Baker Boyer National Bank v. Garver35 found that a trustee breeched its fiduciary duty by 
failing to hedge a portfolio that was concentrated in tax-exempt bonds. The courts, however, do 
not observe a distinction between hedging in organised derivatives exchanges and hedging in 
OTC derivatives market.  
2.5  Interim Conclusions 
When used for hedging derivatives products are intended to increase predictability of exposures 
and reduce volatility in anticipated revenues. Hedging strategies, i.e., the numerical equations 
designed to measure and price volatility and risk in financial markets, can themselves expose 
financial markets to systemic risk when they fail to produce the intended result.36  
In the OTC derivatives market, a floating rate borrower company will purchase a derivative 
instrument to defend itself against the risk of an increasing interest rate. The company will 
enter into an interest rate swap and borrow at a fixed rate. This amounts to hedging against the 
risk that the interest rate will rise, the bet being on the performance of the floating-rate 
indicator compared to fixed-rate indicator. Unfortunately, if the rate does fall, the company will 
lose the potential gains if it had not entered into a swaps contract. The company will then make 
another arrangement and purchase another derivative with a third party that will result in 
profit, if the first one will result in loss. This second transaction will be the reverse and opposite 
of the first transaction (called a perfect hedge). 
In case of a perfect hedge, the company will remain in the same position as it was before 
entering into the market since both transactions have opposite effects and the company is going 
to lose in one, if it earns in the other. Therefore, it can be concluded that a company has no 
commercial interest in entering into a perfect hedge, except when hedging the base contract 
(borrowing on a floating interest rate). Still, the company is exposing itself to the counterparty 
risk, because the counterparty maybe transacting for sole speculation. It can rightly be said that 
in each swaps transaction, the risk is transferred to a counterparty, which will in turn hedge its 
risk with other market participants, thus creating a nexus of contracts interlinking market 
 
34 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. Ct. App.1992) 
35 719 p.2d 583 (Wash. Ct. App.1986) 
36 e.g. Metallgesellschaft; see Christopher L. Culp and Merton H. Mille; Hedging, a flow of Commodity deliveries 
with futures: Lesson from Metallgesellschaft; Derivatives Quarterly (Vol. 1 No. 1 Fall 1994) also, Ruth Kelly and A. 
Hudson; et. al. Hedging our Future: Regulating the Derivative Market (Fabian Society 1994) Discussion Paper No. 18 
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participants to each other.37 Hedging used to insure against risk can provoke a chain of 
transactions, which are systemically unstable.38 
The use of derivatives in hedging strategies, therefore, do not eliminate risk, rather the risk is 
fragmented into smaller amounts, and redistributed among existing participants more willing to 
bear them.39 The danger of systemic risk can arise in such a situation by any of three 
occurrences: the default of a major market player; a large market movement that whips out a 
trader; or the inability of market participants to match obligations.40 The detailed analysis of 
these and other kinds of risks associated with OTC derivatives financing, is made in the next 
chapter.  
3. Associated Risks and Regulatory Approaches  
for OTC Derivatives Markets 
3.1 Introduction 
Growth in OTC derivatives in the past few years has been phenomenal. According to the 
statistical release by the Bank of International Settlements in May 2000, the total estimated 
notional value of outstanding OTC contracts relating to only major banks and dealers in G10 
countries was US$ 88.2 trillion. Where the OTC market has attracted a large number of 
market participants to hedge their risks arising from market volatilities, it has also attracted sole 
speculators due to, inter alia, low cost investment opportunities. This major shift to unorganised 
business has raised legal and regulatory issues. Financial innovation has given birth to new 
complex instruments and has resulted in more complex and less reliable quantitative 
techniques to measure and price risk. Initially intended and designed to mitigate risk of 
individual market participants, derivatives have the potential to expose the entire financial 
market to systemic risk.  
First, different kinds of risks associated with derivatives financing, including legal, equity, credit 
and other associated risks are discussed. We will look at the manner in which the OTC 
derivatives market might give rise to systemic risk. In other words, regulation of OTC 
derivatives markets is justified by economic parameters, i.e., when manifest harm or its 
 
37 e.g. In Hazell v. Hammersmith Fulham; op. cit. Hammersmith Fulham swapped hundreds of times with lots of 
different institutions 
38 R. Kelly and A. Hudson; op. cit. p. 10 
39J. Board; Derivatives Regulations; LSE Financial Markets Group Special Paper No. 70  
40 R. Kelly and A. Hudson; op. cit. p. 10 
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potential is present, expressed in terms of externalities imposed on other market participants 
or in terms of market failure.41  
Second, an introduction to regulating the OTC derivatives market is given along with a 
discussion on the legal nature of derivatives contracts and the legal area to which derivative 
instruments fit into. The discussion also includes some of the regulatory tools available to 
regulators in fighting the risks associated with OTC derivatives, and surveys different regulatory 
approaches adopted by the regulators of the OTC derivatives market.  
The purpose of this part is not to introduce new semantic distinctions into the regulatory 
debate, but to highlight the existing discussions at all levels,- from institutional to academic - 
focusing on why it is we regulate the OTC derivative market and how can we do so effectively.  
3.2. Risks Associated with Derivatives Contracts 
3.2.1. Generally on Risks 
Knowledge of probable risk on an investment over a given time is the most desired piece of 
information in the business world. The exact equation of revenues and costs is the only means 
to forecast the required margin. In economic terms, revenues and costs are divided into fixed 
and variable terms. Adequate measurements and exact pricing of the economic risk such as 
whether commodity prices, interest rates or exchange rates will rise or fall, are the prime 
concerns for market participants. Derivatives are commonly used to remove economic risks, 
and transfer them on other market participants who are more willing to accept them. It might 
be argued that there is no difference between profit making (speculation) and risk management 
in economic terms since both result in an increase in anticipated revenues. It is, however, 
suggested that risk management is an endeavour to mitigate risk arising from speculation and is 
different from speculation because speculation does not result in profit in all circumstances.42 
Risk management tools are effective means to alleviate risk posed to individual market 
participants arising out of speculative profit making business activity. This is why some US 
courts have held that a fiduciary is under a duty to hedge risks effectively.43 
The use of derivatives is not limited to risk management only and it also includes speculation 
itself. Derivatives, whether used to hedge risks or for speculation are not immune to certain 
risks like all other business activities. Following are some of the risks arising out of derivative 
financing. 
 
41 C. Goodhart; The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation; (CBP 1998), p.291 
42 As discussed earlier, (Para.1.3) a perfect hedge may in all circumstances, give the desired result. 
43 See supra Para. 1.2.1.3.2. 
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3.2.2. Legal and Operational Risks 
In essence derivatives are rights or obligations to receive or pay sums of money according to the 
movement in the underlying indicator.44 Since a derivative agreement consists of rights or 
obligations; entering into a derivative transaction raises legal questions, whether these rights or 
obligations are validly created in law and whether or not they achieve (in legal terms) what they 
were intended to achieve or whether these rights or obligations are enforceable under the law 
without undue delay and undue cost.45  
A derivative transaction can be unenforceable because of insufficient documentation, incapacity 
of a counterparty (ultra vires), uncertain legality or unenforceability due to bankruptcy or 
insolvency.46 Another legal risk arises out of the recharacterisation of a derivative transaction; 
i.e. a court re-characterises the transaction. This kind of legal risk is particularly relevant in the 
case of the English Law Credit Support Annex within which an outright transfer might be 
viewed as a security interest, taking the form of the transaction into account, and therefore void 
due to want of registration. English academics have accepted that it is almost impossible to 
avoid the recharacterisation risk for even the best-drafted transaction or statute must use words, 
and words inevitably engender some uncertainty.47 Legal risk and its ancillaries are dealt in with 
in detail in the later part of this chapter while dealing with the legal nature of derivatives. 
There are many other kinds of risks associated with derivatives that cannot be measured and 
predicted by plain calculations. Precisely these risks may arise when systems and managerial 
understanding does not keep pace with market and business opportunities.48 Due to the in-
quantifiable nature of such risk, it is very difficult to protect against it. Market participants hit 
by such operational risks have systemic externalities, when their exposures are relatively high. 
Barings Bank can be one of the examples, where a market participant fell prey to operational 
risk due to the same person working in both back and front offices. Operational risks project 
other kinds of risks and can induce systemic melt down. 
3.2.3. Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity is the status or condition of a business in terms of its ability to convert assets into 
cash.49 Liquidity risk arises when cash flows of a business are insufficient to cover is payment 
obligations. Liquidity risk is divided into two types: market liquidity risk and funding liquidity 
 
44 R. Kelly and A. Hudson; op. cit. p.12 
45 For analysis of legal risk see Trust and Harris; (BJIBFL 1997); p.291  
46 Global derivatives of group of Thirty; Derivatives: Practice and Principles; p.51 
47 S. James; The Law of Derivatives; (LLP 1999); p. 15 
48 Speech given by Clifford Smout published in C. Goodhart; op. cit. p. 331 
49 Blacks Law Dictionary; (sixth edition); (West Publishing Co. US); p. 931 
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risk.50 ‘Market liquidity risk’ is the risk that a large transaction in a particular instrument could 
have an adverse impact on its market price. It, therefore, depends upon the market condition of 
the product/instrument, the size of the position (contract size) and also the creditworthiness of 
the counterparty.51 The risk that sudden volatility may make it difficult for a market participant 
to hedge or unwind a losing position including a derivative position is another related market 
liquidity risk. ‘Funding liquidity risk’ is the risk that mismatches in the cash flow and payment 
obligations of a business may result in contractual non-performance. Liquidity funding plans 
and additional internal funding reserves to avoid such cash-flow mismatches are traditional 
responses to mitigating funding liquidity risk. 
In an illiquid derivative market dealers will try to either cover their uncovered OTC positions 
by taking off-setting positions in an exchange traded instrument or by synarticleing such a 
position through “dynamic hedging”, a process which often mandates either the sale of the 
underlying, when its price falls or its purchase when its price rises.52 These mandated 
transactions could trigger a large number of purchase or sale orders into an already illiquid 
market for the underlying security.53 As the International Capital Markets Report54 suggests 
“the resulting illiquidity may (at the time of crisis) even violate the assumptions underlying the 
models used to construct these portfolios at precisely the time when the hedges are mostly 
needed.”55 
To avoid intervention of credit departments due to full utilisation of credit lines by banks and 
other financial institutions, dealers use collateral and/or margin requirements, which require a 
counterparty to transfer collateral to a bank or financial institution when its exposure to that 
counterparty crosses a certain limit.56 The collateral is retransferred to the counterparty if the 
market moves the other way and the parties can continue to deal despite their credit lines are 
full.57 This arrangement, however, gives rise to three liquidity issues:58  
a. If the limit to call additional collateral depends upon the credit-worthiness of the 
counterparty being calculated by rating system, the lower-rated illiquid counterparty 
might be asked to transfer additional collateral at the nick of the time it starves for it 
 
50 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision; Recommendations for Public Disclosure of Trading and Derivative 
Activities of Banks and Securities firms; (October 1999)  
51 Edward Sunderland; Derivatives-Risky business; Journal of International Banking Law 2001); p. 58  
52 R. Kelly and A. Hudson; op. cit. p. 11 
53 ibid  
54 Part 1-Exchange Rate Management and International Capital Flows; IMF; (August 1993) 
55 Also quoted by R. Kelly and A. Hudson op. cit. p. 11  
56 Edward Sunderland; op. cit. p. 59 
57 ibid 
58 ibid 
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itself. This will result in loss of more liquidity and ultimately in default by such 
counterparty. 
b. A counterparty may use the collateral received from another counterparty to create a 
reverse hedge. In this arrangement such counterparty might be required to transfer 
the collateral to a third counterparty under the reverse hedge even before it receives 
it from its first counterparty due to difference in limits, which result in calling for 
the collateral. This may result in liquidity problems for that counterparty. 
c. If, in the commodities market, a counterparty has hedged its future revenues under 
a collar (combination of put and call option: see Para. 1.1.2.3 supra) arrangement, 
such counterparty might face loss of liquidity as the purchaser of the put option 
exercises its put when the commodity price falls unpredictably. Liquidity loss might 
also arise in case of a sudden and unexpected rise in the commodity price where the 
purchaser of “call” exercises its right to call. 
The illustrations above make it clear how some risk mitigating techniques adversely affect it and 
may result in liquidity risk. Loss of liquidity results in the inability to receive payments by 
counterparties, which adds to systemic risk.59 
3.2.4. Credit Risk 
As said earlier, a derivative transaction is typically an obligation to pay or receive sums of money 
at a certain future date. The financial market yields participants with different franchise sizes 
and different credit-ratings. Since one or the other counterparty is under an obligation, each 
party in a derivative transaction is concerned with the credit rating of its counterpart. A credit 
rating simply reflects the ability and past performance of a business or a person in paying 
debts.60 The probability that the counterparty might default in its payment obligations is called 
credit risk. In its report, Principles for the Management of Credit Risks, the Basle Committee 
described credit risk as “the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its 
obligations in accordance with the agreed terms.” 
While credit rating agencies are performing a very good job in assessing the credit worthiness of 
market participants, individual counterparties usually conduct private investigations before 
entering into a derivative transaction. The balance sheet, obviously, is the first thing to be 
enquired into. Because of the fact that certain exposures, especially in OTC derivatives markets, 
are kept off the balance sheet, balance sheet enquiries are not conclusive evidence of credit 
worthiness. Since payment obligations in a derivatives transaction arise at a future date, the 
transaction maturity date, the lack of an upfront cash commitment by the parties may also 
obscure the eventual monetary significance of the obligations of the parties. 
 
59 A. Hudson; Swaps, Restitutions and Trusts; (Sweet and Maxwell 1999); p. 66  
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Market participants, especially those with high franchise and more sophisticated 
management (e.g. banks and major financial institutions) have generated their own internal risk 
control systems to ascertain their value at risk (VAR) in the ordinary lending market from the 
very start of the transaction. VAR indicates the expected loss from an adverse market 
movement with a specified probability over a particular period of time. As compared to the 
ordinary lending market, it is far more difficult to give an accurate VAR in the derivative field 
due to the continually fluctuating value of the instrument.  
Though, more sophisticated methods to calculate VAR (e.g. J. P. Morgans’ “Riskmatrix” 
methodology) are now available, these do not help the regulators due to the risk-sensitive nature 
of required regulatory capital under capital adequacy frameworks. Higher risk attracts higher 
capital to be set aside to cushion that risk. Internal VAR calculations are, therefore, unreliable 
and can be biased in favour of the entity. It is equally difficult to rely on the marking-to-market 
methods of derivatives value fluctuations. Marking-to-market means the calculation of VAR on a 
derivative instrument on a continual/daily basis. There is, however, no marking-to-market 
model, which convincingly explains the kind of relationship between the scope and degree of 
marking-to-market on the one hand, and the degree of systemic stability on the other.61 There 
are two types of credit risks: market risk and settlement risk.  
Market risk is the kind of credit risk, which, arises out of the market volatility. VAR models are 
actually intended to calculate and ascertain specifically the market risk. Market risk is a double-
edged sword, i.e., even if the market moves in favour of the participant, ultimately it moves 
against the counterparty and adds to counterparty risk. An unexpected flash of market 
volatility, therefore, increases the overall market risk regardless of the way it moves.62 
Settlement risk, as opposed to market risk, is a kind of credit risk that arises out of the default of 
the counterparty. This default can be the result of many incidents, i.e., a counterparty in an 
exchange rate swaps contract, may default because it could not access the necessary currency to 
be paid under the contract; because it failed to instruct properly how to pay (operational failure) 
or even by the introduction of exchange rate controls by the country whose currency was to be 
paid (country risk).63 
Settlement payments in foreign exchange contracts, swaps and repurchase agreements (also 
known as a Repo that allow a borrower to use a financial security as collateral for a cash loan at 
a fixed rate of interest) are usually made by a small number of financial institutions. A large 
amount of the settlement payments represent funds, which the recipient needs in order to fulfil 
its own payment obligations due on the same date. If, on the settlement date, a major market 
player (financial institution) defaults, a situation may arise where many related counterparties 
 
61 Christian de Boissieu; Derivatives Market and Systemic Risk: Some Reflections; in C. Goodhart; op. cit. p. 334  
62 Cf. E. Sunderland; op. cit. p. 58 
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are unable to make payments due to non-receipt from the defaulting financial institution(s). 
This follow-on effect goes on and on to other connected counterparties and non-payment ripple 
out through the system.64 Different schemes of netting like payment netting which occurs 
during the life of the transaction and close-out netting which occurs on the happening of some 
other event,65 have been introduced to cope with the settlement risk. Netting has its own legal 
and regulatory issues and is not unanimously allowed under the insolvency laws in all 
jurisdictions.  
3.3. The Legal Nature of Derivatives Contracts 
3.3.1. Derivatives from a Legal Standpoint 
Derivatives are not conveniently confined to a particular area of law and their study requires 
knowledge of contract, company, commercial property, insurance and corporate insolvency 
law.66 In the broadest legal sense, derivatives are rights or obligations to receive or pay sums of 
money according to the movement in the underlying indicator.67 There is no exhaustive list of 
derivative underlyings. Some important underlyings include currencies, interest rates, equities, 
commodities, treasury bills and bonds.68 Some commentators have suggested that derivatives 
agreements create personal relationships between parties and hence should be regulated under 
the law of contract.69 Others argue that the term derivative is descriptive of a large number of 
choices in action and therefore should be categorised as specific items of property and 
consequently be regulated by property institutions.70 
In derivatives business practice, however, the generic term “derivatives” has no meaning 
without specific mention of the particular derivatives product like options, futures, forwards or 
swaps. Though, the derivation of value is their common feature, every derivative product has its 
own specific features and create distinct legal rights and obligations. Furthermore, there are 
different licensing and other regulatory requirements for each product in different jurisdictions. 
This mandates the proper identification and separate analysis of each derivative product.71 
 
64 Cf. Schuyler K. Henderson; Regulation of Swaps and Derivatives: How and Why? (Journal of International 
Banking Law 1993); p. 357 
65 Cf. A. Hudson; The Law of Financial Derivatives; op. cit. p. 293  
66 Steven Edwards; Legal Principles of Derivatives; (JBL 2002); p. 1  
67 R. Kelly and A. Hudson; op. cit. p.12  
68 A. Giles; The Regulation Governing Derivatives; An International Guide; (International Financial Law Review 
Special Supplement 1992); p. 4  
69 Henry T.C. Hu; Misunderstanding Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of 
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70 A. Hudson; Money as Property in Financial Transactions; (JIBL 1999); p. 170 
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Derivative contracts are arguably a series of executory contracts, as payment obligations 
usually remain to be performed on both sides.72 Trading is ordinarily conducted by telephone 
in the OTC derivatives market and the oral/informal contract is binding on the parties, 
provided it fulfils the essential criteria for the creation of a contract.73 If, however, parties use 
tape recording as evidence of the contract the recording party must notify the other party that 
the telephone call is being taped.74  
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has contributed a great deal in 
standardising the OTC Derivatives contracts.75 In our present legal scrutiny of derivatives 
products, we will also discuss some of the ISDA Master Agreement approaches. 
3.3.2. The Legal Nature of Swaps Contracts  
Woolf L. J in Hazell v. Hammersmith Fulham76 described an interest rate swap in the following 
terms: 
“An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties by which each agrees to pay 
the other on a specified date or dates an amount calculated by reference to the interest 
which would have occurred over a given period on the same notional principle sum 
assuming different rates of interest each payable in each case. For example, one rate 
maybe fixed at 10 percent and the other rate maybe equivalent to the six months 
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). If the LIBOR rate over the period of swap is 
higher than the 10 percent than the party agreeing to receive ‘interest’ in accordance 
with LIBOR will receive more than the party entitled to receive the 10 percent. 
Normally neither party will in fact pay the sums which it has agreed to pay over the 
period of the swap but instead will make a settlement on a ‘net payment basis’ under 
which the party owing the greater amount on any day simply pays the difference 
between the two amounts.” 
The definition was approved by Lord Templeman on appeal to the House of Lords.77 This 
definition raises a number of classification issues,78 i.e., are swaps to be classified as a series of 
executory contract considered as one single agreement made up of a matrix of obligations? 
(Executory contract theory) Or are all the swaps simply reciprocal payments constructed in from 
of mutual debts? (Mutual debt theory) Executory contract theory (also called the single agreement 
 
72 Philip R. Wood; Title Finance, Derivatives, Securitization, Set-off, and Netting; (1995); Para. 10-10 
73 Cf. S. James; op. cit. p. 175  
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75 See ISDA; Master Agreement 1992 
76 [1990] 2 Q.B. 697 at 739 
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approach) is proposed by the ISDA Master Agreement,79 and primarily based upon the single 
payment method under payment netting. The approach suggests that it makes no difference 
how many contracts have been entered by the parties since the payment in the end is set-off 
against each contract and is netted to only one payment. Therefore, all the contracts should be 
treated as one single agreement.  
The single agreement approach has been criticised on the basis of the different economic 
functions intended to be served by each swaps contract, and because they may have been 
entered on different dates with different counterparties and have different termination dates.80 
The criticism was approved by Evans L. J, in Kleinwort Benson v. Birmingham CC,81 where the 
hedging agreements were said to be “separate and independent contracts.”However, they were 
not governed by an ISDA Master Agreement. The single agreement approach under the ISDA 
Master Agreement was motivated by the need to avoid cherry-picking, that is, the power of an 
insolvency practitioner to disclaim unprofitable contracts under section 178 (3)(a) of the 
Insolvency Act of 1986, whilst affirming contracts that are beneficial to the insolvent party.82 
Rejection of the Single Agreement Approach by the courts would enable cherry-picking of 
derivatives contracts.83  
The mutual obligations theory views each swap payment as a distinct contractual debt obligation.84 
Each and every payment made pursuant to a swap agreement is made independently and hence 
has no nexus with other payments.85 Though affirmed by Kleinwort Benson this theory is not 
supported by market participants. It has been suggested that the parties would continue to trade 
in derivatives in pursuit of profit notwithstanding any defective legal foundation of the Single 
Agreement Approach.86  
An important question emerged in Morgan Grenfell v. Welwyn Halfield DC,87 where it was 
contended that an interest rate swap agreement, under a proper construction would be 
construed as gaming. Section 18 of the Gaming Act of 1845 provides that all contracts by way 
of gaming or wagering are null and void. Section 1 of the same Act provides that a promise to 
pay any money in respect of such contracts is unenforceable. The nature of a gaming contract is 
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elaborated in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.88 Where two people with opposite views on 
a uncertain future event, enter into an agreement that one shall pay to the other a sum of 
money depending upon the determination of that event, they are entering into a wagering 
contract.  
In Morgan Grenfall, the courts stated that the purpose of the parties to enter into a derivative 
contract was the deciding element, i.e., if the speculative element is coincidental to the purpose 
of the contract, then wagering is not the purpose of the derivative contract. In City Index v. 
Leslie,89 derivative speculation was held lawful only when it was carried out for business 
purposes. This is also provided by Section 63 of the Financial Services Act of 1986 and Sched.1, 
Para. 12 thereto that derivative contracts are not unenforceable on the ground of gaming, if 
entered into by way of business and constitute offering or agreeing to offer, the buying, selling, 
subscribing for or underwriting of an investment In Morgan Grenfall, business activity is 
considered as an ordinary person would understand it, that is, an organisation involved in the 
capital market that regularly deals in interest rate swaps agreements is doing so in the form of 
business activity rather than on a casual or isolated basis.  
3.3.3. The Legal Nature of Forwards Contracts 
The basis for legal analysis of a forwards contract is that it may be classified as a futures 
contract. The significance of the classification is that if a contract is construed as a futures 
contract, it is void since it fails to fulfil the regulatory requirements attached to a futures 
contract. For example, in the US, the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (the CEA) provides 
inter-alia that trade in futures contracts must be through brokers registered with the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC). In a number of cases, US courts have held that 
certain forwards contracts are in fact futures contracts subject to regulatory oversight.90 The 
conflict is not unique to the US and persists in other jurisdictions, including the UK.91 
US Courts have taken the mode of settlement in a particular forwards contract as a key to 
determine its actual nature. The fact that futures contracts are cash settled and are off-set by the 
parties, all forwards contracts that are cash settled rather than settled by actual delivery, should 
be categorised as futures.92 In MG Ref. & Marketing Inc.93 the Court held that an energy forwards 
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contract was in fact a futures contract since it provided an opportunity for off-set, even 
though the contract is actually for the delivery of the underlying. This conclusion alarmed 
market participants for the test applied would also render swaps agreements as futures 
contracts.94 The CFTC disagreed with the courts findings and decided that the contracts were 
forwards because they contained terms that provided for the delivery of the underlying, even 
though the parties routinely settle the contracts without delivery.95 Several attempts have been 
made in the US to remove the uncertainty e.g. the enactment of the Futures Trading Practices 
Act in 1992 and the issuing of a number of policy statements exempting certain OTC 
transactions from provisions of the CEA but uncertainty persisted till the passing of 
Commodity Futures Modernisation Act 2000 (CFMA 2000).  
3.3.4. The Legal Nature of Options Contracts 
Courts have given different meanings to options and there is no precise definition of an 
options contract. At common law, in Mackay v. Wilson96 Jordan CJ described options as 
“nearly always a ticklish thing”. Options have attracted two contrary views:97 one is that an 
option to purchase is ‘a contract for valuable consideration’; viz. to sell the property (or 
whatever the subject matter maybe) upon the condition that the other party shall, within the 
stipulated time, bind itself to perform the terms of the offer embodied in the contract (the 
Irrevocable Offer Theory). The other view is that ‘an option given for value is an offer’; together 
with a contract that the offer will not be revoked during the time, if any, specified in the option 
(the Conditional Contract Theory). 
It has been suggested that the controversy has little significance from a regulatory point of view, 
since on either theory options would be regulated unless specifically exempted.98 Furthermore, 
there are a number of different kinds of options with varied uses and different subject matter, 
which has resulted in confusion and uncertainty as to the nature of options.99 Lack of a generic 
legal definition suitable for all options, and absence of a unified legal relationship created by 
different kind of options suggest different regulatory modes and standards for each kind of 
option.100  
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3.4. OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risks: Is Regulation Justified? 
Systemic risk is recognised as the most valid reason for financial regulation. Systemic risk is not 
a very well-defined concept, compared to other risks across the financial world. Though the 
term is not very well defined, we all know what a systemic crisis is, when it occurs.101 It has been 
suggested that systemic disturbances can be thought of in two stages.102 Initially, it consists of an 
‘event’ of some description that affects at least one financial institution adversely due to e.g. a 
sharp market move or a decline in the credit-worthiness of a key group of customers. This 
‘event’ is sufficient to cause systemic problems if it simultaneously affects a large number of 
institutions.  
The second stage comes when such an ‘event’ results in the non-settlement by the affected 
institutions. The follow-on situation is called ‘contagion’.103 A ‘contagion’ situation is the more 
dangerous, where institutions are interconnected in the very area of activity affected. On the 
same grounds, economics justifies regulation only when there is manifest harm or its potential 
expressed in terms of externalities imposed on other participants or in terms of market 
failure.104  
It has been argued that OTC derivatives do not create any new or unique risk.105 The argument 
is based on the fact that though the increased use of OTC derivatives is new, they are composed 
of financial instruments and arrangements that have been around for decades. Credit, market, 
liquidity, operational and legal risks are, therefore, not a speciality of OTC derivatives only and 
are regularly faced by market participants in their traditional business. It is, however, not the 
type of risk which is alarming but the increased size of the risk caused by OTC derivatives.106 
OTC derivatives can accelerate systemic risk by any or all of the following:107 first derivatives 
have altered either the likelihood or the severity of an adverse ‘event’. Secondly, widespread use 
of derivatives increases the correlation of default among financial contracts. In other words, 
OTC derivatives have made ‘contagion’ more likely. Thirdly, if risk is borne by more investors 
than before, more participants will be affected by the underlying shocks to the economy arising 
out of the adverse ‘event’.108 The externality of risk extends not only to other individual 
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investors but also to the economy as a whole when it strikes in the major market place. After 
all, even firms that do not use OTC derivatives will also be affected by such strikes.109  
OTC derivatives financing is more prone to systemic risk because of 1) the complexity of the 
products, 2) comparatively less transparency and disclosure by the market participants, and 3) 
due to increased linkage between market segments and individual financial institutions.110 
3.5. How to Regulate OTC Derivatives? 
OTC derivatives regulation has been subject to vociferous public debate in recent years. This 
article is not intended to contribute new theoretical regulatory structures or to introduce an 
unprecedented regulatory strategy for OTC derivatives. In fact, this article compares and 
contrasts existing regulatory regimes in the perspective of developing countries with an objective 
to help them improve their own financial market conditions by increasing market efficiency 
and financial stability.  
The regulatory challenge for OTC derivatives is to assess 1) the associated risk itself, 2) the 
benefits offered by the instruments and 3) the potential costs of regulatory interference.111 
There exists a tendency to overstate the risk of OTC derivatives which leads to proposals that 
would significantly raise the costs of derivative instruments. The challenge, however, is to limit 
the risks while preserving the efficiency of the capital markets.112 
There are two approaches classified according to subject matter, to regulating OTC derivatives 
financing.113 On the one hand, there is ‘institutional’ regulation, i.e., regulation of different 
kinds of enterprises involved in the financial markets and intermedation. On the other hand, 
there is ‘functional’ regulation i.e. regulation of financial instruments and markets according to 
the underlying functions they perform. Since there is a large variety of OTC derivative market 
participants and products, either regulatory approach can be complex.114  
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There is another approach; a hybrid between functional and institutional derivatives 
regulation. The hybrid regulatory approach provides for the regulation of institutions both 
institutionally and functionally.115  
On the institutional level, derivatives regulation could have the following elements:116 
1. It specifies the ‘permissible activities’ in which an institution may engage;  
2. It provides ‘regulatory oversight’ of the institutions engaged in permissible activity; 
3. It provides rules for capital adequacy to ensure the financial stability of each 
financial institution; 
4. It enforces prudential regulations to ensure compliance with regulatory 
requirements; and 
5. It requires the end-users to periodically report the market value of their derivative 
positions. 
On the functional level, derivatives regulation works by:  
1. Providing definitions of permissible financial products; 
2. Requiring compulsory licensing to deal in a lawful product; 
3. Requiring certain products to be traded only on-exchange; 
4. Providing margin requirements for certain products; and 
5. Necessitating registration, documentation or other regulatory requirements for a 
product. 
There is a tendency to prefer functional regulation to institutional regulation especially in the 
US. The view is taken on the basis that functions of the financial system are more stable than 
the institutions that provide those functions at any given time.117 Another benefit of functional 
regulation is that it provides a set of functions to the financial system that are defined 
exclusively, and mutually exhaustively. Regulatory overlap is minimized, i.e., one function 
should not be regulated by more than once agency.118 Functional regulation also precludes 
regulatory avoidance since institutions are run by people who can opt into another category to 
avoid regulations.119 
Functional regulation, however, is not without its costs. Functional regulations are 
implemented as financial products (in the shape of defining permissible financial products) and 
market regulation. Although different functions of a financial system can be defined mutually 
exclusively, functions provided by particular financial products cannot be so defined. Another 
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disadvantage of functional regulation is that it greatly increases compliance costs for 
institutions, which are engaged in multiple financial products by subjecting them to multiple 
regulators. Defining highly complex financial products is also a challenge for functional 
regulation. No jurisdiction has, however, observed strict boundaries of functional or 
institutional regulation in its financial regulatory framework. Even the US, which is a leading 
advocate of the functional approach employs, as we will see in the next chapter, a hybrid form 
of derivatives regulation. 
3.6. Regulatory Approaches to Combat Systemic Risk Arising out of OTC Derivatives 
Systemic risk arsing out of OTC derivatives has alarmed regulators and different regulatory 
responses and suggestions have emerged to preclude systemic externalities of OTC failures. The 
first and most common regulatory response is invoking the rules for capital adequacy. Capital 
adequacy rules are instructions issued by regulators to ensure that financial institutions have 
sufficient capital to cover their investment activities.120 This efficiently internalise the risk arisen 
during the course of business of an institution. The difficulties with capital adequacy 
requirements are that it is very difficult to define and price every kind of risk faced by a 
conglomerate financial market participant. The second problem is that there is no risk-pricing 
or VAR calculation formula, which is suitable for all market participants, regardless of franchise 
size. Another problem with capital adequacy rules is whether internal VAR calculations should 
be relied upon for required regulatory capital or external VAR calculations made by the 
regulators are necessary.  
The second most common response is to introduce disclosure requirements. Since OTC 
transactions are off the balance sheet, they need to be subjected to mandatory disclosures as the 
parties should be able to judge counterparty risk. Additional disclosure of OTC positions along 
with the traditional disclosures is required and a periodic reporting system based on an internal 
risk-management system has been suggested in this regard.121 Disclosure can bring comparability 
and help in strengthening external and internal market discipline.122 
The third regulatory response is in the form of providing mandatory clearing of the OTC 
derivatives like the clearing of exchange-traded derivatives.123 This can effectively reduce the 
counterparty risk. For mandatory clearing, clearing houses would be required to be made 
insolvency remote to avoid the situation of the failure of the clearing-house, which can cause 
great danger to financial system. Another regulatory suggestion is that OTC derivatives should 
be allowed only for hedging purposes and not for speculation. This, again, brings to the 
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difficult task of distinguishing between hedging and speculation from a counterparty stand 
point.124 Yet another suggestion is that all OTC derivatives should be brought to exchanges, i.e., 
derivatives should only be allowed to be traded on an exchange.125 Flex options are the most 
recent example. Still, the problem is that specialised products cannot be traded on an exchange. 
Financial innovation also continuously demands more specialised products.126 
Others prefer stricter internal control; the introduction and strict observation of market 
participants, according to the sophisticated nature of their business, allowing only more 
sophisticated persons to deal in OTC derivatives and introduction of rules of consumer 
protection for OTC derivatives and users are also a subject to discussion in regulatory circles.  
3.7. Interim Conclusions 
OTC derivatives have posed financial markets to systemic risk in the past decades. One 
particular example is Barings Bank as there are suggestions that its failure almost led to some 
systemic externalities.127 Though derivatives financing might not be the only cause of Barings 
failure, it was no doubt the major cause. Study of risks associated with derivatives has revealed 
their potential to pose threat to financial systems. There is a need to speed up regulatory 
response which is not only provides incentive for innovation but also keeps pace with such 
innovation since channelled innovation is recognised as beneficial for financial productivity 
and stability. Another challenge for regulators is to introduce regulation, which is cost efficient 
for both regulators when they force regulatory interventions; and for the regulated when they 
are compelled to regulatory compliances. Keeping in view the standards set forth, we will be 
better able to evaluate the efficiencies of derivatives regulations in some advance jurisdictions in 
our next part. 
4. Regulation of OTC Derivatives in Advanced Jurisdictions 
4.1. Introduction 
The aim of this part is to provide a comparative analysis of regulatory regimes for OTC 
derivatives existing in advanced economies e.g. the UK and the USA. We will begin with the 
UK regulatory regime. For the purpose of better analysis and to give a proper critical treatment 
to latest regulatory changes carried out in the form of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
 
124 See Para. 1.2.1.3.1 supra 
125 Cf. C. Goodhart; op. cit; p. 293 
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(FSMA 2000), a comparison will be preferred between FSMA and its predecessor Financial 
Services Act 1986 (FSA 1986). After taking a precise overview of present regulatory structure, 
we will discuss the specific OTC derivative related provisions of FSMA 2000. Then we will 
move on to the US regulations for OTC derivatives and again our analysis will be in a 
comparative mode between the latest developments and the preceding regulatory structure.  
4.2. Introduction to the UK Financial Regulatory Structure128 
4.2.1.  The FSA and the FSMA 
The UK financial regulatory structure has been greatly reformed by FSMA 2000. FSMA 2000 
can rightly be designated as a revolutionary step towards the creation of a single regulator, i.e., 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) regulating the entire financial conglomerate. The FSMA has 
abolished all the previous regulators for different kinds of financial activities like the Securities 
and Investment Board (SIB) and all the Self-Regulatory Organisations (SRO’s). 
The new FSA is empowered to regulate all the categories of financial business; deals with the 
official listing of securities, controlling insurance business and banking transfers, overseeing the 
regulations of Lloyds of London, combating market abuse, recognising and supervising 
investment exchanges and clearing-houses, regulating competition scrutiny, and overseeing the 
compensation schemes and the ombudsman scheme. The FSA has the objective of maintaining 
confidence in the UK financial system; the promotion of public understanding of the financial 
system including the promotion of public awareness of the risks and benefits of investment; to 
secure consumer protection by considering the degree of risk and experience that a consumer 
may possess and their need for accurate information; and the reduction of financial crime. In 
this regard, the FSA is required to make sure that regulated businesses are aware of the risks of 
their business being used in the commission of financial crime and to make sure that the 
necessary steps are taken to monitor, detect and prevent financial crime. The Parliamentary 
Committee and the Treasury have power to scrutinize the powers exercised by FSA.  
Under FSMA (the Act), the regulatory structure more likely fits into the category of 
institutional regulation since after giving a very detailed list of regulated activities129, it requires 
anyone who deals in such activities to seek authorisation.130 The Act provides for certain 
qualification and other requirements for authorisation and then provides for strict regulation 
of an Authorised Person in accordance with its objectives. Only the relevant provisions of 
FSMA and the instruments provided thereunder relating to OTC derivatives will be discussed 
here. 
 
128 Cf. Butterworths Financial Regulatory Services; Vol. 1 Div. A  
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4.2.2. OTC Derivatives Regulation under FSMA2000 
4.2.2.1. General Requirements 
The UK financial markets are founded on the principle of freedom of contract and even an 
oral contract is binding on the parties without formalities. This creates a perfect environment 
for OTC contracts, where transactions are usually made by telephone. There are no specific 
laws governing OTC derivatives and transactions are generally subject to all the normal 
principles of common law and equity. General principles of formations and proof of contract, 
breach of contract, negligence, mispresentation, negligent misstatement, fiduciary duties etc., 
are applicable to OTC transactions and remedies available for other commercial disputes are all 
available in OTC derivative transactions.131 OTC derivatives regulation is in practice subject to 
light or non-existent regulation132 and the analysis calls for the following tests: 
a. What derivatives products fall under the category of regulated activities? 
b. If a product falls under a regulated activity, what are the requirements to deal in 
such products? 
4.2.2.2. Regulated Derivatives Products under the FSMA 2000  
The Act prohibits any one carrying out investment business in the UK, unless that person is 
authorised or exempted.133 ‘Investment’ includes any asset, right or interest134 covered by any of 
the articles falling under the Regulated Activities Order 2001/544.135 As far as derivatives are 
concerned, Articles 83 to 85 are relevant. (See appendix ‘A’ for full text of the articles) 
Articles 83 to 85 aim to identify financial transactions rather than commercial ones in order to 
overcome the uncertainties relating to the applicability of section 18 of Gaming Act 1845.136 In 
a case dealing with Financial Services Act 1986 part 1 of schedule 1 paragraph 7-9, which 
contained the similar provisions as to the FSMA 2000 article 84 (3) and (4), it was held that 
these particular provisions amount to mandatory deeming.137 The other provisions are merely 
an indication as to whether the transaction falls on the commercial or financial side.138 Under 
 
131 E. Bettelheim, H. Parry & W. Rees; Swaps and Off-Exchange Derivatives Trading: Law and Regulation; (FT Law 
and Tax 1996); p. 15,16 
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134 Sec. 22 (4) 
135 See online at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2001/20010544.htm#83 
136 Cf. S. James; The Law of Financial Derivatives; (LLP 1999); p. 125 
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article 4 ‘a transaction delivery’ seems to be the deciding factor in rendering a contract a future. 
Under FSA 1986 provisions139 it was possible to run a foreign exchange book outside the scope 
of the provisions, as long as the contract provided for delivery within seven days.140 This is now 
precluded by Article 84 (4) of the FSMA 2000, by providing an objective test to construe the 
actual nature of the transaction, where there exists an understanding regardless of the express 
terms of the contract; that the delivery would not be made within seven days. 
Article 84 attempts to distinguish between a commercial and investment purpose, to ensure 
that the Act does not cover genuine commercial transactions, which also commonly provide for 
delivery in the future. In fact, it is not always the case even in financial transactions that the 
delivery is not made and the contract is closed-out by another transaction. Transactions carried 
on, e.g. at London Metal Exchange, may sometimes also be concluded by delivery. This may be 
very unusual, but not impossible.141 This however, does not mean that the Act will not apply to 
such transactions and Art. 84 (3) clearly states that the transaction is to be regarded as made for 
investment purposes if it is made or traded on a recognised investment exchange. Another 
enquiry into Art 84 could be whether it covers only ‘futures’ contracts or is also applicable to 
‘forwards’ contracts. The words “or made otherwise than on a recognised investment exchange 
but is expressed to be as traded on such exchange or on the same terms as those on which an 
equivalent contract would be made on such an exchange” are clear enough. The article also 
covers forwards transactions.  
Contracts for differences cover a wide category of contracts. Contracts for differences under FSA 
1986 schedule 1 Para. 9 covered interest rate swaps since their purpose or pretended purpose is 
to secure a profit or avoid a loss by reference to fluctuations in the value or price of property.142 
For the same reason currency, equity, commodity and total return swaps were also likely to be 
contracts for differences.143 The position may have been changed now by providing article 85 
(2) (b): “rights under a contract under which money is received by way of deposit on terms that 
any interest or other returns or other returns to be paid on the sum deposited will be calculated 
by reference to fluctuations in an index or other factor”. This seems to exclude certain interest 
rate swaps where net payments are made.  
The scope of options under Article 3 of the FSMA seem broader than FSA 1986 options that 
were limited to the options expressly provided for by it, like currency options, and gold, 
palladium, platinum and silver options, and did not cover the options to buy e.g. copper.144 
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FSMA Article 83 starts with providing a sweep up provision, i.e., options to acquire or 
dispose off…(a) a security or contractually based investment (other than one of the kind 
specified by this article); and then specifically mentions some of the options, including the 
currency of the UK or any other country or territory. The sweep up provision brings every kind 
of options, which is a ‘contractually based investment’ within the scope of Article 83, regardless 
of the mode of settlement. A credit swaps option which gives the buyer the right to transfer the 
underlying asset will also be considered a contractually based investment. The position is clearer 
where the underlying asset is a security. 
4.2.2.3. Requirements to Deal in a Regulated Derivatives Product 
In our discussion of regulated derivative products above, it is evident that a large number of 
derivative products whether on or off-exchange fall within regulated activities. If an OTC 
product or other derivative activity falls within the regulated activities, it becomes subject to all 
regulatory requirements provided for in investment business. The Act makes it a criminal 
offence if a person carries on activities in breach of the general prohibition stated in Sec. 19 of 
the Act.145  
Although a person who commits such criminal offence is subject to the maximum of two years 
imprisonment and an unlimited fine, it is a defence for a person to show that he took all 
reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid committing the offence.146 Breach 
of the general prohibition may also result in the agreements being unenforceable (Sec. 26-29 of 
the Act). Under Sec. 22 of the Act, for an activity to be a regulated activity it must be carried on 
‘by way of business’. The business element differs depending upon the activity in question.147 It is 
a question of judgement whether or not an activity is carried on by way of business. Elements 
include degree of continuity, the existence of a commercial element and the proportion which 
the activity bears to other unregulated activities carried on by the same person.148 
The salient features of the present UK regulatory approach can be summarised as follows: 
1. It takes a liberal approach as to what OTC activities are taken and focuses on who is 
doing the activity; 
2. When an activity falls under a regulated activity, it provides strict authorisation 
requirements; 
3. When an authorised person is engaged in OTC activities, it provides strict rules for 
consumer protection, thus focuses on with whom the business is done.  
 
145 Sec. 23 of the Act (Contravention of the General Prohibition) 
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From the perspective of risk, the regulatory approach requires strict capital adequacy rules. 
UK capital adequacy rules provide a required capital ratio that imposes both triggered and 
targeted capital to the total risk weighted assets.149 It provides principles of business integrity; 
due skill, care and diligence; standards of reasonable care to organise and control with adequate 
risk management systems; financial prudence; proper standards of market conduct; consumer 
protections; clear and fair customer information; management of conflict of interest; and open 
coordination with the regulator.150  
4.3. OTC Derivatives Regulation in the United States 
4.3.1. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA 2000) 
Derivatives regulation in the US was a mixture of banking, securities and bankruptcy laws. The 
situation created conflicts, complexities and ambiguities of jurisdiction and applicable law when 
multiple areas of law and regulation came together. The need to overhaul derivative regulation 
was long felt and as a result the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA/the 
Act) was signed into law by President Clinton on December 21, 2000.151 The CFMA 2000 
replaced the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA) and amended securities, banking and 
bankruptcy laws. The CFMA 2000 addresses uncertainties regarding the status of OTC 
derivatives and hybrid instruments under the CEA by providing a number of exclusions and 
exceptions. The CFMA 2000 also modernises the regulatory structure and clarifies the legal 
status of certain derivative products like non-retail swaps.152 The most important provisions of 
the CFMA 2000 relate to the authorisation of the clearing of OTC derivatives and 
establishment of a framework for the regulation of clearing organisations. 
Before the passing of the CFMA 2000 all trading of ‘contracts for future delivery’ were required by 
CEA to be carried on in exchanges. Although Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the 
CFTC) had exempted a number of transactions from the application of the CEA, a large 
number of derivative transactions could not fit into the statuary exclusions or exemptions 
provided by the CFTC. The exemptions only covered some specific financial products related 
to futures and swaps. The result of this was a comparative disadvantage and fleet of business to 
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more flexible overseas markets.153 The OTC derivatives related provisions of the CFMA will 
now be discussed and the regulatory infrastructure provided therein revealed. 
Section 2 of the CFMA 2000 state the purposes of the Act, which are, inter alia, to eliminate 
unnecessary regulation for the commodity futures exchanges and other entities regulated under 
CEA; to bring jurisdiction clarity of CFTC; to provide a statuary and regulatory framework for 
allowing the trading of futures on securities; to promote innovation for futures and derivatives 
and to reduce systemic risk by enhancing legal certainty in the market for certain futures and 
derivative transactions; to reduce systemic risk by providing clearing facilities of transactions in 
OTC derivatives, through appropriately regulated clearing organisations. For OTC derivatives 
the CFMA 2000 has two main features: 
a. It brings legal certainty for OTC derivatives;  
b. It allows clearing facilities for OTC derivatives through recognised clearing 
exchanges. 
4.3.2. Legal Certainty for OTC Derivatives 
Before the passing of CFMA 2000, there was a great deal of uncertainty regarding the legal 
status and enforceability of OTC derivatives transactions. The CFMA 2000 brings legal 
certainty by providing that no contract shall be unenforceable under the CEA or any other 
provisions of federal or state law, based on a failure to comply with any exemptions or 
exclusions provided by CEA.154 A broad range of swaps agreements and OTC derivatives 
agreements have been brought outside the application and jurisdiction of the CEA and CFTC 
respectively. The CFMA 2000 provides for a specific category of participants, which are ‘eligible 
contract participants’,155 and then provides that the transactions involving any commodity (other 
than an agricultural commodity) that is not executed on a ‘trading facility’ is excluded from the 
CEA application, if they are entered into by Eligible Contract Participants (ECPs) and are 
subject to individual negotiations.156 The term ECPs includes natural persons with more than 
5,000000 US$ in assets, who enter into the related transactions for risk management purposes. 
It also includes non-US regulated insurance companies and banks and their US branches and 
agencies; participants acting as brokers, agents, investment advisers or fiduciaries; and financial 
institutions such as a large proportion of federally or stately regulated institutions. Numerous 
provisions of the CFMA 2000 apply to ‘agreements, contracts or transactions’. Swaps Exemption 
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provided by the CFTC in 1993 was applicable to only ‘swap agreements’ and required a swap 
to meet certain tests of being a certain type of agreement to be excluded from CEA.157 The 
enhanced application of the Act clearly makes it applicable to all types of swaps.158  
A trading facility is defined as a person providing a facility in which multiple persons have the 
ability to execute or trade contracts by accepting bids and offers from multiple participants. An 
organised exchange is, inter alia, a trading facility that permits trading by or on behalf of 
persons who are not ECPs. 
The swap exemptions (part 35 of CFTC regulations) contains four elements:159  
1. The swap agreement is entered into between eligible swap participants;  
2. The swap agreement is not part of a fungible class of agreements that are 
standardised as to their material economic terms; 
3. The creditworthiness of the parties is a material consideration in entering into or 
determining the terms of swaps agreement; and  
4. The swap agreement is not entered into or traded through a multilateral transaction 
execution facility. 
The new Sec. 2 (d)(1) is broader than the old swaps exemption because first, a statuary 
exclusion that can only be modified by Congress is inherently more robust than a regulatory 
exemption that can be modified by agency action. Secondly, Sec. 2 (d)(1) applies to any 
transaction and not merely to ‘swap agreements’. Thirdly, ‘eligible contract participants’ is 
broader than ‘eligible swaps participants’, fourthly, both the non-fungibility and credit 
worthiness requirements in swaps exemptions have been dropped; and finally, Sec. 2 (d)(1) 
replaces ‘multilateral transaction execution facility’ with only ‘trading facility’.160  
Another provision with legal certainty is Sec. 2 (d)(2) which states that nothing in CEA (except 
the provisions relating to derivatives clearing organisations) governs or applies to a transaction 
of an ‘excluded commodity’, if the transaction is: 
1. Entered into on a principal-to-principal basis by parties trading for their own 
account or; 
2. By parties trading as an authorised investment manager or fiduciary;  
3. Between ECPs (other than while acting as brokers); 
4. Executed or traded on an electronic trading facility.  
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This makes it clear that the transactions entered into by ECPs on a principal-to-principal 
basis are exempt. But what is the principal-to-principal basis? This is said to include: 
“Any transaction whereby a party to a transaction books the transaction for parties’ own 
account. It includes ‘riskless principal’ transactions whereby one party enters into a 
transaction and thereafter contemporaneously enters into an off-setting transaction so 
that the risk or payments under the transactions net out. The fact that the party has 
entered into off-setting transactions in no way alters the principle to principle nature of 
the transaction and any party which has entered into a riskless principal transaction 
maybe assured that its contracts remain legally enforceable and excluded or exempted 
from the jurisdiction of the CFTC and/or SEC as applicable.”161 
Sec. 2 (g) provides for the ‘excluded swap transactions’. Swaps on all commodities other than 
agricultural commodities are excluded by Sec. 2 (g) from the application of CEA subject to 
similar conditions required to be satisfied for the application of Sec, 2 (d)(1) except that Sec. 2 
(g) also requires that the agreement be ‘subject to individual negotiations’. While Sec. 2 (g) applies 
to all commodities except agricultural commodities, it clearly covers commodities like metals, 
chemicals and energy products that are not traded on a trading facility and are entered into by 
ECPs subject to individual negotiations. Further Sec. 2 (h)(1) provides that (subject to certain 
exceptions) nothing in CEA applies to an ‘exempt commodity’, if carried on by ECPs at the time 
they enter into the transaction and is not entered into on a trading facility. The exemptions to 
Sec. 2 (h)(1) general exclusions are Sec. 5b and 12 (e)(2)(B) and certain provisions relating to 
fraud and manipulation of market price. 
CFMA 2000 also provides for exclusions of certain swap agreements that fall under the 
definition of ‘covered swaps agreements’, from the jurisdiction and application of CFTC or CEA 
when offered, entered into or provided by a bank.162 A covered swaps agreement is a ‘swap 
agreement’ including a credit or equity swap based on a commodity other than an agricultural 
commodity enumerated in Sec. 1a (4) of the CEA, if the swap agreement: 163 
a. Is entered into by ECPs; 
b. Not executed or entered into on a trading facility. 
Such a ‘swap agreement’ is an agreement defined under Sec. 206 (b) of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
which states: 
“The term swaps agreements means any individually negotiated contract, agreement, 
warrant, note or option that is based, in whole or in part, on the value of, any interest 
in, or any quantitative measure or the occurrence of any event relating to, one or more 
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commodities, securities, currencies, interest or other rates, indices, or other assets, 
but not included any other identified banking product as defined in paragraphs (1) 
through (5) of subsection (a).” 
This clarifies the status of swaps agreements and the new definition covers all interest, currency, 
credit, equity, commodity, weather or other derivatives contracts. For this purpose, swaps 
agreements do not include transactions involving the purchase or sale of a security or a put, call 
or option on a security since the definition of ‘security’ in Sec. 2 (a)(1) of 1933 Act and Sec. 3 
(a)(10) of 1934 Act has been amended by the Act by providing that ‘security’ does not include 
any swaps agreements.  
The new provisions effectively remove any confusion about the status of swaps under US 
Securities Laws that existed before the Act. Title 3 of the Act provides a distinction between 
‘security based’ and ‘non-security based’ swaps agreements. The former is a swaps agreement of 
which a material term is based on the price, yield, value or volatility of any security or any group 
or index of securities and the later means any swaps agreement that is not a security-based swap 
agreement.164 The Act makes security-based swaps agreements subject to anti-fraud, anti-
manipulation and anti-insider trading provisions of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. It is, however, 
not clear whether the SEC has regulatory authority over security-based swap agreements.165 
The Act establishes two categories of clearing organisations for derivative products: “derivatives 
clearing organisations” that are subject to regulations of the CFTC and “multilateral organisations” 
that are subject to banking or securities regulation.166 OTC derivative transactions eligible for 
exclusion may be cleared through a multilateral clearing organisation and not through 
derivative clearing organisations. It is, however, not mandatory for an OTC derivative to be 
cleared, but when it is cleared, it must be cleared by a multilateral clearing organisation. To be 
registered as a clearing organisation a statement must be submitted that it complies with the 
core principles. The core principles address matters like financial resources, participant and 
product eligibility, risk management, settlement procedures; treatment of funds, default rules 
and procedures, rule enforcement, system safeguards, reporting, record keeping, public 
information and information sharing.167 OTC transactions may also be cleared by a securities 
clearing agency regulated by SEC under the 1934 Act, or certain foreign clearing organisations 
approved by the SEC, CFTC or federal banking regulators. A multilateral clearing organisation 
is defined as a system used by more than two participants where the bilateral credit exposures of 
participants are effectively eliminated and replaced by a system of guaranteed, insured and 
mutualised risk of loss. 
 
164 Cf. Memorandum of ISDA Members; op. cit. p. 41 
165 Cf. ibid. 
166 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000: Watershed Legislation for Derivatives; May 2001 available 
at: http://www.mfcafe.com/pantry/ls_0501.html. Para IV 
167 ibid 
 Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2010#1 
35
4.4. Interim Conclusions 
We have seen that although the US CFMA 2000 generally focuses on the regulation of 
products and markets it also provides core principles regulating intermediaries. Under the Act 
the CFTC is also required to review and report the possible replacement of intermediary or 
institutional regulation addressing inter alia the “core principles” and “interpretation of acceptable 
business practices”. This clarifies the hybrid regulatory approach adopted by CFMA by providing 
the regulation of institutions both institutionally and functionally. In contrast, the UK 
regulatory regime set forth by FSMA 2000 connotes an institutional approach. It imposes a 
general prohibition to engage in investment business and then provides regulatory oversight 
into regulated investment business. The investment business under FSMA covers a large 
number of OTC transactions with certain swap exemptions.  
The US OTC regulation has been generally subjected to deregulation by CFMA 2000 where a 
large number of swaps and other OTC derivatives have been exempted or excluded from the 
application of the CEA and the regulations of the CFTC. The emphasis shifted to ECP’s 
(eligible contract participants). For a natural person to qualify as an ECP, he is required to have 
more than 5,000,000 US$ in assets and enter into the related transaction for risk management 
purposes. This again brings into question the blurred distinction between risk management and 
speculation.168 Other ECPs include regulated banks and companies. 
An optional clearing facility for OTC derivatives is a positive step. The number of market 
participants opting to avoid optional clearing facilities with obvious clearing costs and other 
requirements will by no means be attractive and a large number of participants will opt not to 
avail the facility. Core principles required to be observed by clearing organisations are efficient 
enough to prevent its failure, is another inquiry. 
A comparison between US ECPs and UK Authorised persons, US CFMA exemptions and 
exclusions and UK FSMA regulated activities reveal that the UK OTC derivatives regulation is 
more relaxed for some swaps and other OTC transactions.169 The result is that in the UK 
certain swaps are accessible to more market participants than in the US, with virtually no 
regulatory requirements. However, the institutional nature of the regulation requiring 
prudential standards and customer protection make it advent that all business activities are 
organised and channelled.  
Furthermore, under the present regulatory structure, it is not possible in the US for other than 
ECPs to use swaps agreements. Under CFMA 2000 Sec 105 (c) the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve is required to conduct a study of issues relating to the potential use of swaps 
agreements by non-ECPs’. The UK imposes no restrictions on offering OTC derivative 
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products to persons who are not authorised under FSMA. This freedom is fenced by 
requiring a high level of customer and consumer protection and setting prudential standards 
since the relationship is still governed by FSMA where one of the parties is an Authorised 
person. 
Hitherto, we have developed a good knowledge of OTC derivatives financing, its associated 
risks, and the regulatory approaches adopted by UK and US financial regulators. In the light of 
UK and US regulatory approaches, an attempt is made to reveal the role that OTC derivatives 
can play in developing countries, and how regulators can use this monster in a useful manner.  
5. Benefits, Suitability and Regulatory Challenges for Developing 
Economies  
5.1. Benefits 
This concluding part of the article will focus on the role of OTC derivatives in developing 
economies. We will deal with the questions like: Are there any benefits of OTC derivatives? Are 
they suitable for developing economies? If yes: what are the regulatory challenges for developing 
economies to use OTC derivatives to increase market efficiency without jeopardizing financial 
stability? While dealing with these questions we will discuss the role of OTC derivatives in 
developing countries generally and in Pakistan particularly where it is necessary and 
appropriate. 
After ever-increasing use of OTC derivatives in the past three decades, there are still 
apprehensions about derivatives. One such apprehension is that derivatives do not serve any 
economic purpose, only increases speculation and market volatility and cause instability for 
institutions and the system. There is, however, a tendency to overstate the associated risks and 
ignore the economic role played by OTC derivatives. There are mainly two categories of OTC 
participants, i.e., end users or dealers. End users are government entities, institutional investors, 
financial institutions and corporations. The dealers include highly rated and large banks; highly 
rated insurance companies and securities firms. Dealers act as intermediaries who quote bids 
and offers and commit capital to satisfy customer demand for derivatives.170 
Numerous studies conducted by international and national organisations have revealed that 
OTC derivatives provide several benefits to end users.171End users benefit from the lowest 
funding costs and more diversified funding sources by swaps; for example, a company can 
borrow in the cheapest capital market, even across border, without regard to the currency in 
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which the debt is denominated or the fixed or floating interest rate payment mode. End 
users can also benefit from derivatives by hedging their exposures against risks arising from 
price and interest rate fluctuations. It is because of interest rate swaps that banks are able to 
offer long term funding, like mortgages with short term liabilities that re-price frequently, such 
as certificates of deposits; and better manage their asset liability mismatches. Commodity swaps 
are used by airlines and oil refineries to hedge their exposures to fluctuating oil prices. 
Some users like institutional investors and portfolio managers may use derivatives to enhance 
asset yield. The case settlement benefit of derivatives enables institutions to exchange cash flow 
on one asset to cash flow of another asset like an exchange rate. Where securities are poorly 
traded for an undesirable feature, derivatives can provide a synthetic instrument to neutralize 
the undesirable element, thus, creating a higher yield instrument as compared to a traditional 
instrument of equal credit quality. Derivatives are an efficient tool for asset liability 
management. Borrowers can use interest rate swaps to raise the proposition of fixed rate to 
floating rate coupons for fixed rate coupons, thus alleviating the need to actually sell any of its 
securities. 
Derivatives also benefit dealers in many ways.172 Derivatives have increased both the average 
credit quality and the diversity of credit risk to which dealers are exposed. Derivatives also 
provide profitable income streams that help the dealers reconstruct their capital bases, and 
diversify their sources of income. With the help of derivatives dealers are improving their risk 
management techniques arising in traditional business practices. The risk management 
techniques originally developed for derivatives are also being applied to risk management and 
has resulted in the improved safety and profitability of these institutions. 
Innovation is recognised as beneficial for the economy173 Derivatives, as discussed earlier, 
reduce funding costs and diversify funding sources for market participants. An efficient 
derivative market can help boost the competitiveness of an economy in global economic 
uprising. Derivatives provide new and efficient tools to manage exposures to interest rates, 
foreign exchange rates and commodity prices; with an organised derivatives market an economy 
will have better exposure management capability and will attract the international business 
investors and large market participants. The lower cost funding provided by derivatives, help 
large capital formations increase business activity in spot markets and stimulate economic 
growth.  
5.2. Are OTC Derivatives Suitable for Developing Economies? 
OTC derivatives have been frequently criticized for the scale of their associated risks and high 
levelled leverage. The issue whether OTC derivatives are suitable for developing economies may 
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be address by inquiring into the following two questions: Firstly; can OTC derivatives fit into 
any financial system? Secondly, to what extent is the regulatory initiative plausible to introduce 
OTC derivatives in a developing economy? 
There are two aspects of the first question: the regulatory aspect and the philosophical aspect. 
From the regulatory aspect of a financial system, we have observed in the preceding part while 
discussing the regulations of OTC derivatives in the UK and the US that the OTC derivatives 
market is doing well in both financial systems, regardless of opposite regulatory approaches. In 
the UK any OTC activity is allowed without regulatory requirements, unless the concerning 
activity falls under one of the regulated activities provided by the Regulatory Activities Order; 
whereas in the US no OTC derivatives activity is allowed, unless exempted or excluded from 
regulation by CFMA 2000 or other related regulatory enactments. It is however, submitted that 
from the perspective of developing countries, the US approach would be more suitable. It is the 
strong institutional and judicial background and principles long established, followed and 
carried out in the UK that allow UK regulators to adopt such a liberal approach, and such are 
scarce in developing countries. 
Furthermore, ever-increasing innovation in the OTC derivatives market calls for checks and 
appropriate risk assessment before a new instrument is introduced in a developing market since 
the regulatory framework may not keep pace with the changing financial atmosphere. A US-
type general prohibition, followed by approvals in the form of exemptions and exclusions after 
proper assessment of an OTC instrument is, therefore, more plausible for developing countries. 
The philosophical aspect of financial systems calls for appropriate scrutiny of any developing 
country and a relatively close scrutiny, especially in the context of Pakistan. In principle, every 
financial system is meant for active participation in economic growth and welfare of the society 
at large. The objectives of a financial system are no different around the globe, regardless of its 
philosophical background. Pakistan being conservative economy with mixed Capitalist and 
Islamic philosophy may face difficulties in introducing an innovative financial device. 
Nevertheless, the present situation where standard derivatives products, like forwards and 
options, already exist and are allowed by the State Bank of Pakistan and where the rupee-dollar 
forward already has a liquid market, the introduction of more derivative products would not be 
a new prodigy. Furthermore, the OTC derivative trading in shares of small companies in the 
Karachi Stock Exchange have already been approved by the Securities and Exchanges 
Commission of Pakistan.174 
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It might be argued that OTC derivatives are complex, exotic instruments and, thus, that 
participants in developing country markets will have difficulties in understanding them.175 In 
fact, trading in standard derivative products like forwards and options is not new in for example 
India and Pakistan and related derivative products already exist in various markets including 
equity markets. 
To what extent is then the regulatory initiative plausible to introduce OTC derivatives in a 
developing economy? The fact is that the OTC derivative market has emerged and grown in an 
unregulated atmosphere. Regulation of OTC derivatives emerged when their potential to cause 
financial meltdown was felt in some disastrous failures, many of which were directly or 
indirectly caused by derivative financing. The regulatory approach in the last century was to 
prohibit OTC derivatives for their same potential, but the regulatory approach in 21st Century 
is to allow OTC derivatives financing channelled in a systemically stable way because of their 
positive potential in mitigating risks arising out of traditional business with resulting financial 
stability and economic growth. This is the reason why the OTC derivatives market has gone 
through a large scale de-regulation in US. 
Now the economies that do not have systems of derivatives hedging are believed to be deprived of 
the benefits of a beneficial financial instrument and are in a comparative disadvantage. Benefits 
of exchange trading of derivatives are not denied a tailor-made-low-cost OTC instrument is highly 
effective if the dangerous elements like illiquidity and undisclosed positions are removed. It is not 
necessary for financial innovation to originate from market participants. Initiatives in developing 
countries can be taken by the regulator and introduce new instruments with specific regulatory 
requirements; instruments that can attain the ultimate objectives. 
OTC derivatives are, no doubt risky and highly leveraged instruments. This might form the 
basis for arguments against the introduction of OTC derivatives in developing countries. Banks 
and other financial institutions and corporations are less sophisticated in both technique and 
technology, so the risk element will be more prominent. It is, however, suggested that though 
the risks associated to OTC derivatives have caused great alarm, they are now well defined and 
comprehensively elaborated. Techniques like clearing, facilities for OTC derivatives and capital 
adequacy requirements and an increased emphasis on skilled and prudential management have 
proved effective to keep the OTC market well liquid and coping with other risks. Regulatory 
initiatives can ab initio curtail legal uncertainty. Furthermore as Alan Greenspan the Chairman 
of Federal Reserve Board of the US has rightly said, “there are some who would ague that the 
role of the bank supervisor is to minimise or even eliminate bank failure; but this view is 
mistaken in my judgement. The willingness to take risk is essential to the growth of a free 
market economy. [I]f all savers and their financial intermediaries invested only in risk free 
assets, the potential for business growth would be never realised.” 
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5.3. Regulatory Challenges for Developing Economies 
5.3.1. Financial Integrity and the Reduction of Systemic Risk 
Since derivatives are risky and highly leveraged instruments, developing economies that intend 
to introduce or have already allowed OTC transactions in different areas of financial activity 
have to combat certain regulatory challenges. Developing economies may not be strong enough 
to sustain defaults of large number of major market participants. Protection against systemic 
risk is therefore the biggest regulatory challenge for developing countries. Regulatory challenges 
for developing countries may be discussed under the following headings. 
Integrity of the investment market is essential for the promotion of orderly raising of capital. 
Developing economies need to establish framework for the free operation of the market, 
establishing rules of conduct designed to improve the flow of information and the confidence 
of market participants. OTC derivative financing is required to be brought under the general 
heading of investment business and required to be authorised like credit institutions and 
investment firms. Once OTC derivatives are recognised as investment business subject to 
authorisation, other requirements like capital adequacy, minimum standards of prudential 
management and standards of internal control can also be applied. 
Capital adequacy requirements are recognised efficient tools to internalising credit and other 
kinds of risks. The risk sensitive nature of the required capital, i.e., depending upon and 
increasing along with the nature and degree of the risk, would be more suitable for developing 
economies. Capital requirements may also be made adjustable depending upon the nature, size 
or sophistication of a firm. There is a corresponding need to establish systems to monitor 
compliance of capital requirements. Depending upon the regulatory model, capital compliance 
may be monitored by different regulators than the one that monitors compliance with conduct 
of business rules.176 Influence can be taken from the guidelines of the ‘Basle Capital Adequacy 
Accord’ (1993) and the ‘EC Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directive’ adopted in 1993. One 
of the major challenges, however, for capital adequacy rules is to design a usable method for 
calculating total risk that is suitable for all market participants.177 
Because of the inter-linkage among financial institutions, close co-operation is necessary among 
regulators of different sectors of the national financial systems to assure the financial integrity 
of authorised financial institutions, prevent conflict of interest and to reduce systemic risk. This 
is the reason that leads to a single financial regulator in UK. The free flow of information and 
close co-operation among different regulators is highly important in the absence of a single 
financial regulator. To prevent systemic crisis, firms engaging in OTC activities should also be 
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made subject to minimum standards of prudential regulation and internal control. The fact 
that OTC derivatives can be complex and difficult to understand presents a need for skilled 
management capable of understanding and managing risks associated with such exotic 
instruments. An appropriate settlement and clearing system also helps to reduce systemic risk 
arsing out of OTC derivatives. The US has already taken an initiative to provide a clearing 
facility for OTC transactions. 
Certain institutions, like banks, securities houses and insurance companies are regarded as 
central to a financial system. Since they are given a monopoly in certain products and certain 
kinds of activities, they are usually regulated by specialised regulators (except in the UK), who 
exercise detailed supervisory authority over their activities.178 In the context of OTC derivatives 
regulations two issues arise; should a monopoly on OTC derivatives be given to specialised 
institutions or should OTC activity of regulated institutions be specially regulated.179 
The proponents that suggest that specialised institutions should be given the monopoly over 
OTC derivatives hold that this will enable the regulator to closely monitor and control the 
developments of OTC derivatives.180 This kind of regulation is termed ‘ring fencing’.181 Ring 
fencing necessarily provides that institutions should be restricted to their own specialized 
activities e.g. deposits-taking may be limited to banks that are then subject to disclosure and 
prudential requirements and securities dealing may be restricted to registered brokers/dealers, 
who are subject to requirements as to disclosure to customers and making determinations as to 
suitability of certain types of instruments for customers.  
By ring fencing, OTC derivatives can be restricted to only one type of institution, which can be 
closely regulated. In return for monopoly over a product, control can be placed on these 
regulatory institutions, designed to control their solvency and conduct of business in the form 
of prudential management requirements. Ring fencing may also make possible the achievement 
of certain policy considerations relating to OTC derivatives. For instance, if it is determined to 
regulate swaps offered to the general public, one approach might be to limit the offering of 
swaps to the public to offers by institutions whose solvency and conduct of business is 
supervised.182 Ring fencing, is however, criticized on the grounds that the focus should be on 
how to control an institutions’ involvement in derivatives business rather than on forbidding 
it.183 The second issue i.e. should OTC activity of regulated institutions be specially regulated is 
evidenced by US OTC derivatives regulations. As discussed in the preceding part, US OTC 
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derivative regulation mainly focuses on individual OTC products. The system provides 
definitions of OTC products and clarifies the capacity to deal in those products. In recent years 
there has been a tendency towards specific derivatives legislations184 Developing economies 
should be required to clarify questions as to capacity, i.e., whether or not a regulated institution 
should be permitted to enter into OTC activities and also the circumstances under which such 
activity is permitted or prohibited. Such clarifications may be necessary both to enable the 
institution to have access to the swap market and to protect the OTC market from potentially 
serious losses from a finding that the counterparty lacked capacity.185 
5.3.2. Legal Certainty and Protection of Less Sophisticated Persons186 
Certain issues with respect to the legal certainty of OTC derivatives transaction demand 
particular attention. Firstly, developing economies need to enhance legal certainty relating to 
enforceability of OTC derivative transactions under certain circumstances and between certain 
counterparties. For example, in some jurisdictions certain OTC products may fall under the 
laws relating to the prohibition of gambling. Removal of this uncertainty is vital. Secondly, 
there should be legal certainty as to the enforceability of bilateral contractual arrangements that 
are intended to govern the use of collateral, and the close out or liquidation of derivative 
positions in the event of a default or insolvency. ISDA provides legal certainty in this context by 
providing essential close out netting. In the absence of close-out netting and legal certainty 
regarding the enforceability of bilateral collateral arrangements OTC derivatives will always be 
exposed to legal risk.  
Another challenge for developing countries will be the protection of the less sophisticated 
person or average citizen from the depredations of somewhat greedy and untrustworthy large 
institutions. The protection of less sophisticated persons may be achieved by any of the 
following ways: by excluding less sophisticated persons from the OTC derivatives market, and 
limiting the use of OTC derivative product to institutions and individuals which are subject to 
the regulations regarding dealing with the general public.187 This approach is adopted by the 
US, where OTC products are limited to eligible contract participants (ECPs). ECPs are those 
market participants, which fulfil certain requirements and meet certain financial tests.188 
Secondly the protection is achieved on the pattern of the UK wholesale market regime, by 
regulating the conduct of businesses providing capital adequacy requirements for those market 
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participants who are authorised in dealing with the general public in investment business 
including OTC products. The UK regulatory framework imposes a higher degree of disclosure 
and standard fiduciary obligations on market participants offering investments to the general 
public .189 
Developing economies also need to prepare customer protection laws where the customers are 
protected from misleading, fraudulent and abusive practices. Full disclosure is required for 
customers making informed investment or risk management decisions. Customers’ assets also 
need protection from defalcation on intermediary insolvency.190 
There are certain other regulatory challenges, which according to market conditions could 
appear in a developing economy in OTC derivative regulation. For example, a government may 
wish to regulate the price of certain commodities (e.g. agricultural commodities), which it 
deems central for the proper functioning of its economy.191 It may, therefore chose to regulate 
OTC instrument that affect the price or marketability of those commodities. Some jurisdictions 
especially developing, have systems like exchange controls intended to protect the domestic 
economy or monetary systems, to protect the integrity of the local currency, to manage the local 
interest rate, to restrict capital outflows or to protect domestic institutions from foreign 
competition.192 Regulation of certain OTC products, e.g. swaps, would be important for the 
effectiveness of such protections.  
6. Final Conclusions 
OTC derivatives are no doubt very risky and highly leveraged instruments. At the same time, 
they can serve numerous financial purposes and participate in economic growth and prosperity. 
As far as the risks associated with OTC derivatives are concerned, we have seen that these risks 
are well identified and comprehensively defined. Legal liquidity, credit and market risks are 
exhaustively investigated and known by both financial regulators and market participants. 
Secondly, these risks are not special to OTC derivatives, but are also faced by market 
participants in traditional investment business. It is true that OTC derivatives increase linkage 
between market segments and individual financial institutions. This linkage can cause 
contagion in case of failure and can ignite systemic meltdown, but certain regulatory tools like 
capital adequacy, increased disclosure requirements, and clearing facilities have proved to be 
effective to internalise these risks and prevent systemic externalities of such failures. With the 
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help of regulatory tools the financial market regulators in both the US and the UK has made 
of OTC derivatives market very reliable and productive. 
OTC derivatives are equally beneficial for end users, dealers and the economy at large. End 
users benefit from lowest funding costs and more diversified funding sources by the use of 
OTC derivatives. Hedging of risks arising out of traditional investment business is important 
and according to some US courts it is even compulsory. OTC derivatives hedging has proved 
itself an efficient instrument to hedge against different kinds of risks arising out of traditional 
business activities. Dealers can generate activities profitable income stream, reconstruct their 
capital basis and diversify their sources of income. With an organised OTC derivative market, 
an economy will have increased financial activity with better exposure management capability 
and will also attract international investment and large market participants. These are the 
benefits, which are longed for by any financial market regardless of nature or size. 
Contemporary economies that prohibit derivatives hedging are deficient in a beneficial 
economic income source, and are at a comparative disadvantage. The ability to use OTC 
derivatives to unbundled financial risk into separate components is an important step in the 
direction of creating more complete and efficient financial markets.  
Worries related to OTC derivatives are that they fail to perform as expected in the times of 
stress when major firms are at risk of suffering loss and many other smaller institutions are at 
risk of illiquidity, if not insolvency. The fact is that OTC derivatives can give rise to systemic 
instability due to their dynamic nature of gross credit exposures, the absence of necessary 
information to market participants, their effects on available aggregate credit and market 
liquidity, and for their enlarged market size. Inadequate counterparty assessment, limited 
understanding of market dynamics and liquidity risk assessments, and legal and regulatory 
uncertainty are also major factors that participate in OTC derivatives market precariousness. 
Furthermore, the OTC market is dominated by internationally active large institutions and the 
failure of single such institution can bring global financial meltdown. 
Increased market discipline with symmetric information mechanisms and increased 
cooperation between the regulator and the regulated is required to fight against these problems. 
The mechanism that makes mandatory the disclosure of the minimum information necessary 
for useful market discipline and effective official supervision and surveillance is essential. 
Prudential regulations and particularly capital adequacy requirements are also vital in this 
regard. A U.S-type clearing facility available for OTC transactions can effectively remove 
liquidity risks. Secondly, for the better and smooth function of the OTC derivatives market, 
developing economies are required to provide higher degree of legal and regulatory certainty. 
Enforceability of OTC derivatives and bilateral collateral arrangements and the recognition of 
close-out netting are major areas in this context. 
In addition to these challenges, developing countries wishing to introduce derivatives 
may face some peculiar challenges as well according to the individual circumstances and 
their financial and economic conditions. There might be policy considerations like the 
protection of the domestic economy or monetary system, protection of the market/price 
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of certain commodity that can be affected by OTC activities, or protection against 
capital outflows, which can necessitate regulation of certain OTC products, for example 
swaps, in a particular fashion. The US type functional approach with general restrictions 
followed by exemptions to deal in certain product after proper risk and regulatory 
assessments is believed feasible in such circumstances. 
